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It is generally taken for granted that economic crimeexacts a heavy price but not many studies have beendone in the past to identify vulnerable sectors or the
magnitude of losses, except those of a direct and obvious
nature. One area where organised crime has made a major
impact is the health sector. The threat of chemical agents
being used by terrorists looms large, and there have been
reports of such agents being deployed in Japan and possibly
Vietnam and elsewhere. Terrorists tend to use whatever
they can access in order to maximize damage and attract
publicity, and in this scenario the use of chemical agents
becomes a potent and convenient tool of destruction.
John Bentivoglio, Special Counsel for Health Care Fraud
and Chief Privacy Officer, US Department of Justice,
reminded his audience at the Symposium on Healthcare
Internet and E-Commerce, Washington DC, on March 27,
2000 that over a decade ago, Janet Reno, the then
Attorney-General of the United States, described health
care fraud as the second priority for the US Department of
Justice (the first priority was violent crime). Janet Reno
herself, speaking to the American Hospital Association
Annual Membership Meeting, Washington DC, on
February 2, 1998, stated that between 1992-98 health
care fraud prosecutions and investigations in the United
States had increased by 400% . In 1997 more than a billion
dollars had been recovered by way of criminal fines, civil
settlements and administrative penalties.
This figure, however, pales into insignificance in the
context of findings (also referred to by Janet Reno) that a
staggering sum of US$ 20 billion had been overpaid by the
Medicare Programme to hospitals, doctors and other
healthcare providers. In one instance, a psychiatrist and his
corporation had billed the government for over $5.2
million, claiming that the psychiatrist himself had provided
the services when in fact unlicensed therapists had been
deployed for the purpose. In the same year, more than
2,700 businesses and individuals had been blacklisted from
future participation in federal health care programmes.
Investment in health care is massive; what has been
detected in the United States, for instance, was described
by Janet Reno as not mere fraud but “outright fraud”. The
situation is worse in other countries that do not have
effective audit and law enforcement agencies focusing on
the health sector. Transparency International’s 2006
Global Corruption Report highlights fraud in the
healthcare sector in many countries around the world. The
Report provides case studies of fraud in the provision of
pharmaceuticals and in the disbursement of funds for
national AIDS control programmes.
CORRUPTION OR FRAUD IN THE
DOMESTIC SETTING
Corruption or fraud in the domestic health care setting
occurs in many ways, such as the following:
• manipulation of the tender and procurement system;
• submission of false claims for reimbursement;
• improper selection of health care providers and
facilities;
• use of counterfeit drugs and charging for more
expensive branded products;
• inappropriate payments or benefits to health care
providers by drug companies and hospitals;
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• theft of property such as drugs and medical devices;
• use of inappropriate or unnecessary interventions or
tests;
• malpractices including conflict of interest and
unauthorized work practices;
• improper access to and sharing of confidential patient
data; and,
• negligence and abuse of authority.
In some cases, these are well planned and orchestrated;
in others, these occur in an ad hoc manner and after a “test
run” become widespread and part of the “culture of
corruption”.
The list of corrupt practices in the health sector is
expanding all the time, and the revelations contained in
Transparency International’s Report of 2006 are just the
tip of the iceberg. What happens within AIDS programmes
in some countries and some institutions is simply shocking.
In the wake of the Tsunami disaster large sums of money
became available for rehabilitation work, but reports from
Sri Lanka and Indonesia, for instance, exemplify how funds
have been siphoned off to enrich a few to the detriment of
the unfortunate many. A few examples of the corrupt
practices identified so far include: malpractice in the award
of tenders for reconstruction projects; houses which pose
a health hazard; poorly constructed roads and bridges
which might collapse at any time; allocation of houses even
to those who were not affected by the Tsunami; and, public
utility services that provide dirty water. In Sri Lanka, an
abandoned baby was claimed by several women, and
custody was finally awarded by the courts to the biological
mother as determined by DNA tests.
IMPACT OF ORGANISED TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC CRIME ON HEALTH SERVICES
Organised transnational economic crime and its impact
on the health services is an area that does not appear to
have received much attention. This article will, therefore,
focus on transnational organised crime as it relates to the
health sector in the context of the misuse of precursor
chemicals.
The regulation of drug trafficking is not new; in Sri
Lanka, for instance, a 17th century law banned the
marketing of opium. Corruption within the public sector
has received much attention in the new United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. Interestingly, the Sri
Lankan law enacted in 1675 provided for the banishment
from the island of public servants who were convicted of
drug offences. Banishment of nationals is no longer
considered as a traditional form of penal sanction;
however, a law on pharmacies and pharmacists drafted
recently in the Maldive Islands provided for banishment for
repeat offences. The penalty for a first time offence was not
only a fine but also house arrest.
Domestic drug-related laws as well as the international
drug control treaties until the 1980s focused on plants
from which narcotic drugs can be derived as well as on the
finished products such as heroin or cocaine or LSD.
Cannabis and raw opium are the substances of abuse that
can be used in their natural form. Others must go through
a chemical process. Given the less than satisfactory result
in preventive and law enforcement efforts in controlling
the production, distribution and use of drugs of abuse, the
United Nations and Member States took a significant step
forward in drafting a new international Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances. The Convention was adopted in 1988.
Article 12 of the Convention provides for the regulation
of chemicals (known as “precursors”) without which most
drugs of abuse under international control cannot be
manufactured. A regulatory approach was adopted because
the legitimate uses for these chemicals make their
prohibition impossible (see further, Jayasuriya,DC, “South
Asia: Precursor Control- Current and Emerging Trends”,
Journal of Financial Crime, Vol 7 (3), 2000, 270-73.
One of the 24 chemicals regulated by the Convention is
Acetic anhydride – a chemical used, for instance, in the
manufacture of paracetamol, the over-the-counter pain
killer. It is also used in car batteries, as a nail polish
remover, and as a dye in the garment industry. Without
acetic anhydride it is not possible to convert opium
(morphine) into heroin. Acetic anhydride is manufactured
in about 20 countries only by legitimate firms for licit
purposes.
The rationale for regulation is simple; restrict access to
legitimate uses and make it impossible for the drug mafia
to use it to manufacture heroin. However, all that the illicit
drug industry in countries such as Afghanistan and
Myanmar requires to manufacture heroin for a year is a
mere .004% of total acetic anhydride production; hence
the drug mafia attempts to divert supplies from
manufacturing plants, warehouses, retail and wholesale
outlets and even during transit.
The cost of such diversions is staggering. In India, for
instance, even transport vehicles have been hijacked and
the truck driver and other passengers brutally murdered.
In Australia, a pharmacist was shot dead in an attempt to
steal a small quantity of another chemical. The official price
of a litre of acetic anhydride in India, for instance, is
approximately $2 .Outside the factory, smugglers will offer
bribes amounting to as much as five times the chemical’s
value; near the Indo-Pakistan border it would fetch 10-20
times more.
The investment is worthwhile for one reason. The illicit
drug industry’s annual turnover is estimated at US$400
billion, or approximately 8% of the total global
international trade (see UNDCP, World Drug Report, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p 124). A farmer in Pakistan is
paid only $80 for a kilogram of opium. After conversion14
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into morphine and then to heroin, the value of one
kilogram of heroin in the streets of New York, for instance,
is approximately $290,000. This massive profit would not
be possible without the illicit drug industry having access
to a small quantity of this vital chemical.
When countries exercise greater vigilance to prevent
diversions through strict import/export controls,
monitoring, and sharing of information, new supply
sources and routes emerge (see further United Nations,
Report of the INCB for 2005: Precursors and Chemicals Frequently
Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, New York, 2006). When it became difficult to
smuggle acetic anhydride from India to Afghanistan
through Pakistan, acetic anhydride manufactured in China
was smuggled to Afghanistan through the Central Asian
Republics – a circuitous route which exploited porous
borders and untrained customs and border control
officials.
CONTROL OF PRECURSORS
The control or precursors has an interesting political
dimension to it. Indo-Pakistan cooperation in drug control
matters commenced in the mid-1990s, when due to
pressure exerted by the US government both countries
were forced to enter into an agreement. Bilateral talks took
place at periodic intervals, but at enforcement level the
ground reality was quite different. For instance, it was not
possible for an officer in either country to speak to his or
her counterpart over the telephone and arrange a
controlled delivery or share information with regard to an
imminent diversion unless special permission was sought –
a process bound to take a month of Sundays. Arranging a
test match between the two countries in the midst of
political tension perhaps took much less time.
One of the worst cases of diplomatic interference
occurred when authorities in Thailand intercepted a
shipment of ephedrine from India to North Korea. This
chemical is a vital ingredient in the manufacture of cough
syrups and broncho-dilators, but is misused by the drug
mafia to manufacture amphetamines. South Korean
authorities alleged that North Korea had no legitimate
requirement for such a large quantity of this chemical,
which was to be used to illicitly manufacture
amphetamines and flood the South Korean and Japanese
markets. The abuse of amphetamines is a major problem –
it is estimated by the United Nations Office for Drug
Control that out of the 200 million who abuse drugs
worldwide, approximately 35 million use amphetamine-
type stimulants.
The North Korean authorities asserted that due to a
severe winter millions were sick and badly needed cough
medicines. The country had no foreign exchange to import
large quantities of the finished product, and hence
domestic production was the only viable option. It was
only after several months of acrimonious exchanges and
interventions by the United Nations that the shipment was
finally released; by the time it reached North Korea and
cough medicines were eventually manufactured and
marketed, it may have been too late for many.
The diversion of precursor chemicals is a well
orchestrated criminal activity involving groups in several
countries across many continents. Diversion routings are
becoming more complex., forgeries of the signatures of
authorized importers are becoming more sophisticated,
and professional chemists have been kidnapped to work for
the drug mafia to experiment new methods of
manufacturing drugs using chemicals not under
international control. Since reputable chemicals
manufacturers have risk minimization and due diligence
systems in place, attempts are being made to set up
clandestine manufacturing plants.
The international law enforcement community is better
equipped today than in 1988 when the Convention was
adopted to intercept diversions. However, new reports from
the United Nations Office for Drugs Control that opium
production in Afghanistan has dramatically increased in
2006 are a cause for concern, particularly because of the
possible increase in the availability of heroin worldwide if
the required precursor chemicals can be accessed.
LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM
OPERATIONS OF ORGANISED CRIME
NETWORKS
This case study illustrates several interesting dimensions
to the operations of organised criminal networks. The
direct and indirect costs of these operations is beyond what
can be quantified. There are several lessons that can be
drawn from this case study, namely:
• Even where an international treaty has created
obligations, effective implementation depends on
domestic factors such as political will; skills and ability
of those who are entrusted with responsibilities; and
cooperation of all countries.
• Unfounded concerns can cause immense damage and
loss if certain countries act upon such concerns without
being satisfied as to their basis or the justification for
intervention.
• Law enforcement must focus on interceptions
throughout the chain of events since it is much easier
to detect and prevent during the early stages of an
operation;
• A delicate balance needs to be struck between
“legitimate needs” on the one hand and “misuse or
abuse” on the other, and regulations must not impose
an unduly heavy or disproportionate burden.
• Since criminals tend to be one step ahead of law
enforcement efforts, preventive measures must be
adapted based on changing trends. 15
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Good health is often taken for granted, and the value of
health care services and products is generally realized only
in times of medical need, pain and suffering. The evolution
of health care services worldwide has brought out the best
in some individuals, who with dedication and
determination have done their utmost to improve care,
and the worst in a few others who have exploited
opportunities for fraud and corruption.
We salute those who serve humanity, and must stand
united to condemn the few who have disgraced and
continue to disgrace humanity.
Dr Dayanath Jayasuriya
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Report assesses performance
and future direction of the
Public Defender Service
The Public Defender Service has achieved its objective
of providing a good quality service that is equal to, and in
many respects better than, the general standard provided
by private practice in comparable areas, according to an
independent research report.
The research was carried out by a team headed by
Professor Avrom Sherr, Director of the IALS, and Professor
Lee Bridges of the University of Warwick. It was based on
an analysis of the six PDS offices during the Service’s first
three years of operation from 2001-04, and the report was
published in January.
On the issue of cost, the report concluded that over the
research period the case that the PDS can provide general
criminal defence services at a comparable cost to contract
providers remains unproven. Figures showed that the PDS
was much more expensive, with average costs in the first
three years of operation running at between 40-90 per cent
higher than those of comparable private practice. However,
various factors connected with the start-up process
combined to ensure that all the public defender offices
(PDOs) operated below capacity in terms of chargeable
hours per fee earner throughout the period of the research.
The report found that in relation to case processing and
legal advice there was evidence that PDO advisers were
more likely to attend in person on clients held in police
stations than their counterparts in private practice. There
was also a clear pattern in several areas of PDO lawyers
advising clients to use their right of silence more often, and
this appears to have benefited PDO clients in police
stations by making them less likely to be charged or
summoned for a criminal offence than clients of private
practice. No such significant differences were recorded in
the processing of cases in magistrates’ courts or the Crown
Court, or in terms of sentences received.
When assessing quality and independence the report felt
that perhaps the greatest strength of the PDS in
comparison to private practice lay in its ability to present
good information, well communicated to clients in well
structured files. In the report’s opinion, the best basis for
evaluating quality is provided by the peer review process,
where case work is assessed by independent and
experienced criminal defence professionals. However, the
report also drew on the views of criminal justice
professionals surveyed, whose overwhelming view was that
there was little perceptible difference between the quality
of service provided by the public defender offices and
private practitioners in their areas. The exception to this
conclusion was the views of solicitors in private practice.
During the early days of the service, the report considered
that the PDS’s devolved management structure contributed
to a lack of consistency in management and quality of services
in offices during the early days. This structure was replaced in
2004, with PDS office heads becoming responsible for both
management and professional matters to the head of the
service, an experienced criminal defence solicitor. Staff
morale however was good, and contributed to the standards
of service achieved; the client-focused, not-for-profit quality
service principles of the PDS were valued by its employees,
many of whom had previous experience of private practice.
A loud note of discord was struck by the Legal Aid
Practitioners Group. Director Richard Miller called for an
end to what he termed “the scandal of continuing with this
expensive project”, and criticized the PDS for its quality of
service in relation to the private sector considering the
amount of public money given to it and the lower number
of chargeable hours worked.
In summary, the report found that one of the main
lessons to be learned from its evaluation and the PDS pilot
project was the need for a clear understanding of the policy
objectives behind the PDS by the government, the Legal
Services Commission (LSC), and the staff of the PDS. The
government had tended to see the PDS as a mixed system
for the delivery of criminal defence services which both
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